# Mapping the biotech and medtech board: who holds which pieces
A diabetic patient in Ohio pays for an insulin pen at the pharmacy counter. The list price might read $300. The company that made the insulin, say Novo Nordisk or Eli Lilly, keeps only a fraction of that. The rest is split among players most patients never see: a pharmacy benefit manager, a wholesaler, a group purchasing organization, a contract manufacturer. Understanding who captures which slice is the whole game in this sector.
Let's trace two products, an insulin pen and an oncology drug, across the board and name exactly who controls what.
A common mistake is to treat "healthcare" as one market. Medtech (devices, diagnostics, hardware) and biotech/pharma (molecules, biologics) run on different rails.
Define the key acronyms up front:
Insulin is a near-oligopoly. Three companies (Novo Nordisk, Eli Lilly, and Sanofi) supply the overwhelming majority of the world's insulin (commonly cited as roughly 90%, estimate). That concentration is a power fact: with three players, price competition has historically been limited, and biosimilar entry (a copycat version of a biologic drug) has been slow and expensive to develop.
The pen itself, the injector mechanism, is often designed with or manufactured by device specialists like Ypsomed or SHL Medical. So even a "pharma" product has a medtech supplier embedded in it. The brand owner controls the molecule and the label; the pen supplier controls a critical piece of the delivery experience and holds real leverage during patent cliffs when device design can extend a franchise.
Here is where value leaks away from the manufacturer. In the US, three wholesalers (McKesson, Cencora, formerly AmerisourceBergen, and Cardinal Health) distribute the vast majority of drugs. They take a margin for logistics.
Then the PBM sits between the manufacturer and the insurer. The manufacturer sets a high list price, then pays the PBM a rebate (a retroactive discount) to win favorable formulary placement (the insurer's list of covered drugs). The net price the manufacturer actually keeps can be far below list.
A simplified worked example (illustrative numbers, not a real contract):
List price of pen: $300
Manufacturer rebate to PBM: -$150 (50% rebate, plausible for insulin)
Wholesaler + pharmacy margin: -$40
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Net revenue to manufacturer: $110The patient may still pay based on the $300 list price if they have a high deductible, while the manufacturer nets $110 and the PBM captures value from the $150 spread. This gap between list and net is the single most important dynamic in US pharma economics.
For the mechanics of how rebates and formularies actually work, the Commonwealth Fund has a clear free explainer: How Pharmacy Benefit Managers Work.
In most of Europe, a national payer negotiates directly. In the UK, NICE (the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence) assesses whether a drug is cost-effective before the NHS pays for it. Germany's system (via the IQWiG assessment and G-BA body) sets prices after a benefit assessment. There is no PBM layer capturing rebate spreads the way there is in the US. Result: European list prices for insulin are far lower, and the middleman margin pool is much thinner.
Oncology is dominated by Big Pharma (Roche, Merck, Bristol Myers Squibb, AstraZeneca, Pfizer) plus a wave of biotech challengers that get acquired once their molecule shows promise. This is the core competitive rhythm of biotech: small companies take early scientific risk, and incumbents buy the winners. Roche's oncology franchise and Merck's Keytruda are examples of incumbent dominance built partly through internal R&D and partly through acquisition.
Complex biologics and cell therapies are frequently outsourced to CDMOs like Lonza or Samsung Biologics because building a sterile biologics plant costs hundreds of millions and years. The CDMO holds quiet power: capacity is scarce, so a manufacturing slot can gate a product launch. During the 2020 to 2022 period, CDMO capacity constraints were a real bottleneck across the industry.
Oncology drugs are often infused, not swallowed. That changes the board entirely.
So the same company (say Cencora) shows up in both stories, but in the insulin case it is a bulk wholesaler and in the oncology case it is a specialty distributor with more clinical services and more margin.
Now take a device with no molecule: an insulin pump or a cardiac pacemaker from Medtronic, Abbott, or Boston Scientific.
Here the balance of power shifts toward the hospital procurement side. A GPO like Vizient negotiates the price. But device firms hold two strong cards:
1. Physician preference. Surgeons and cardiologists often want a specific device they trained on. That loyalty weakens the GPO's ability to force commoditized pricing.
2. Razor and blade lock-in. A pump or a surgical robot creates recurring revenue in consumables, sensors, and service contracts. Medtronic's continuous glucose monitoring and pump ecosystem is a classic example: once a patient is on the platform, switching costs are high.
Knowledge check
1. Why is it a strategic mistake to analyze biotech/pharma and medtech as a single market?
2. A patient sees a $300 list price for an insulin pen but the manufacturer keeps only a fraction. What concept does this illustrate?
3. If a new company wants to sell a medical device to hospitals, which intermediary is it most likely to need to work with?
4. Select ALL correct answers about the role of a PBM in the pharma supply chain.
Select all the correct answers.
5. Select ALL correct answers that describe why market concentration matters in this sector.
Select all the correct answers.
Step back and the pattern is clear: the player who controls access to the patient or the payer captures disproportionate value.
The competitive threat everyone watches: consolidation. When a PBM, an insurer, and a pharmacy sit under one roof, an independent manufacturer or specialty pharmacy has fewer places to turn.