# Supply chain finance & reverse factoring optimization
When Carillion collapsed in January 2018, its balance sheet showed roughly £148 million in net debt. The reality, uncovered by the UK Financial Reporting Council and a parliamentary inquiry, was closer to £1.3 billion once its "Early Payment Facility", a reverse factoring program run through Santander, RBS, Lloyds and others, was reclassified from trade payables to bank debt. Suppliers were waiting 120 days for payment. Banks were waiting 45. The 75-day gap was, in effect, a hidden working capitalworking capitalWorking capital is the difference between a company's current assets and current liabilities, measuring short-term liquidity and the funds available to run daily operations.View full definition → loan that no analyst could see in the published accounts. By the time anyone understood the structure, 3,000 employees had lost their jobs and £2 billion in government contracts were in chaos.
This is the paradox of supply chain finance. Used well, it's one of the most elegant working capital instruments a CFO has, it can simultaneously extend your DPO, strengthen your supplier base, and lower your suppliers' financing costs. Used badly, it becomes off-balance-sheet leverage that can take down a FTSE 250 company in 18 months. In 2026, with the IASB's amended IAS 7 and IFRS 7 disclosure rules now in their second full year of mandatory application, and with rating agencies actively reclassifying SCF balances as debt, the CFO who doesn't understand the mechanics is exposed.
Supply chain finance (SCF), also called reverse factoring or approved payables finance, is a three-party arrangement. The buyer (typically an investment-grade corporate) approves a supplier's invoice. A funder, usually a bank or fintech platform like Taulia, PrimeRevenue, or C2FO, pays the supplier early, at a discount based on the buyer's credit rating, not the supplier's. On the original invoice due date, the buyer pays the funder the full face value.
The economics are real. A mid-market supplier whose own borrowing rate might be SOFR + 600 bps can get financed at SOFR + 150 bps because the credit risk being underwritten is the buyer's. The buyer, in turn, can negotiate longer payment terms, moving from net 45 to net 90 or 120, because the supplier doesn't actually wait that long for cash.
1. Classic reverse factoring. Buyer-led, bank-funded, single funder per program. This is the Carillion model and what most people mean when they say "SCF." Think Procter & Gamble, which in 2013 extended payment terms to 75 days and offered SCF through Citi and Deutsche Bank, credited with releasing roughly $2 billion in working capitalworking capitalWorking capital is the difference between a company's current assets and current liabilities, measuring short-term liquidity and the funds available to run daily operations.View full definition →.
2. Dynamic discounting. Buyer-funded, no bank in the middle. The buyer uses its own cash to pay early in exchange for a discount. Cleaner accounting (it's just early payment), but it consumes cash rather than generating it. Apple and Walmart run hybrid programs that allow suppliers to toggle between dynamic discounting and bank-funded SCF depending on Apple's or Walmart's cash position.
3. Multi-funder platforms. Taulia (acquired by SAP in 2022) and PrimeRevenue allow dozens of funders to bid for supplier receivables, creating price competition. This is where the market has moved post-2023 as single-bank programs became concentration risks following the SVB and Credit Suisse failures.
Carillion's collapse is the case every CFO should study, not because reverse factoring is bad, but because it shows precisely how the structure can be abused.
Beginning around 2013, Carillion used its Early Payment Facility to push supplier payment terms from 45 days to 120 days. Suppliers, desperate to keep the contract, accepted, and then drew on the bank facility to get paid earlier. From Carillion's perspective, trade payables ballooned. From the suppliers' perspective, they were being paid roughly on time. The banks sat in the middle holding receivables they expected Carillion to settle.
Here's the accounting trick: Carillion classified the entire £498 million SCF balance as trade payables on its balance sheet, not as borrowings. Moody's, in a now-famous May 2018 report, estimated the company's adjusted net debt was actually 4x the reported figure once SCF was reclassified. The FRC subsequently fined KPMG £21 million for its role in the Carillion audit failures.
The lesson isn't "don't use SCF." The lesson is: if SCF changes the economic substance of your payables, if suppliers wouldn't accept your terms without it, then it's financing, not trade credit, and it must be disclosed as such.
If Carillion wasn't enough, Greensill Capital's 2021 collapse drove the point home. Greensill packaged SCF receivables into investment funds sold by Credit Suisse, with concentrated exposure to GFG Alliance (Sanjeev Gupta's steel empire). When Greensill's credit insurance was withdrawn in March 2021, the entire structure imploded, Credit Suisse investors lost roughly $3 billion, and the contagion contributed to Credit Suisse's eventual forced merger with UBS in March 2023. The Greensill collapse pushed the IASB to accelerate disclosure reform.
The disclosure regime has changed materially. Since fiscal years beginning January 1, 2024, the IASB's amendments to IAS 7 and IFRS 7 require explicit disclosure of:
In the US, the FASB's ASU 2022-04 has been in effect since 2023, requiring similar disclosures in 10-KKThe average number of new users each existing user generates through referrals. Above 1.0, growth compounds on itself and becomes exponential.View full definition → filings. The SEC has been aggressive, in 2024, it opened inquiries into several Russell 1000 companies whose SCF disclosures were deemed inadequate, and Moody's and S&P now routinely reclassify SCF balances as debt for ratio purposes when programs exceed certain thresholds (typically when SCF exceeds 20% of total trade payables or when DPO has expanded by more than 15 days following program launch).
For European CFOs, the CSRD adds another layer: supplier payment practices are now reportable under ESRS S2 (workers in the value chain), meaning extending payment terms via SCF can show up as a supplier welfare issue in your sustainability report.
Knowledge check
1. In the Carillion collapse, what was the approximate gap between the company's reported net debt and the figure once its reverse factoring program was reclassified as bank debt?
2. In a typical reverse factoring arrangement, the discount rate charged to the supplier is based on whose credit profile?
3. Under the amended IAS 7 and IFRS 7 rules now in their second year of mandatory application in 2026, what must companies disclose about supplier finance arrangements?
4. Select ALL correct answers about the legitimate benefits of a well-structured supply chain finance program for a buyer-CFO.
Sélectionnez toutes les réponses correctes.
5. Select ALL correct answers about warning signs that an SCF program may be reclassified as bank debt by auditors or rating agencies.
Sélectionnez toutes les réponses correctes.
Let's get practical. Here's the framework for a CFO building or reviewing an SCF program in 2026.
Before extending terms, ask: would suppliers accept these terms without the SCF facility? If no, you're financing. The IASB's substance-over-form principle, combined with auditor scrutiny post-Carillion, means your CFO sign-off needs to document this analysis.
Unilever provides a good model. When it extended terms to 90 days globally in 2014 under Paul Polman, it offered SCF through multiple banks. Unilever's CFO at the time, Jean-Marc Huët, explicitly framed the program as a supplier financing benefit, kept SCF balances disclosed in MD&A, and resisted using extended DPO as a cash flow lever for earnings management. By 2023, Unilever's SCF program covered over $5 billion in payables but was consistently classified by S&P as trade payables, not debt, because the substance supported it.
Single-bank programs are concentration risk. The 2023 banking turmoil taught CFOs that a funder pullback during stress is when you need the facility most. Best practice in 2026 is a multi-funder platform (Taulia, PrimeRevenue, Kyriba) with at least three active funders and an explicit "funder substitution" provision in the program agreement.
Don't wait for the auditor to ask. Your SCF footnote should disclose: program structure, funders, payment term ranges (with and without SCF), carrying amount, and year-over-year movement. Boeing's 2024 10-KKThe average number of new users each existing user generates through referrals. Above 1.0, growth compounds on itself and becomes exponential.View full definition → is a useful template, it disclosed $9.1 billion in SCF balances, the funder list, and explicit reconciliation.
The CFOs I've worked with use three internal limits:
SCF programs fail when procurement uses them as a cudgel to extend terms unilaterally without treasury's input on debt-classification risk, or when treasury launches programs without procurement understanding the supplier dynamics. The strongest programs, Maersk's, Siemens', Johnson & Johnson's, have joint governance with quarterly reviews.
Here's what gets missed in textbook treatments: SCF, done well, is a supplier resilience tool. In the post-COVID, post-Ukraine, post-Red-Sea-disruption environment, your tier-2 and tier-3 suppliers' liquidity is your operational risk. A 2024 McKinsey study found that companies with mature SCF programs had 31% fewer supplier disruptions during the 2022-2023 supply chain shocks.
Toyota's keiretsu-style supplier finance, formalized into a modern SCF platform in 2019, is the gold standard. When semiconductor shortages hit in 2021, Toyota's tier-2 suppliers had access to liquidity at Toyota's cost of capital, meaning fewer failures, faster recovery, and Toyota maintaining production when GMGMGross margin is the share of revenue left after subtracting the direct cost of producing goods or services, expressed as a percentage of revenue.View full definition → and Ford were idling plants.
This is the strategic frame: SCF isn't a treasury optimization play. It's a supply chain resilience investment that happens to release working capitalworking capitalWorking capital is the difference between a company's current assets and current liabilities, measuring short-term liquidity and the funds available to run daily operations.View full definition →.
1. Run the substance test on every existing SCF program this quarter. Document whether suppliers would accept current terms without the facility. If not, prepare for reclassification of balances as debt, and brief the audit committee before your auditor or rating agency does.
2. Update your IAS 7 / ASU 2022-04 disclosures to gold standard. Use Boeing's 2024 10-KKThe average number of new users each existing user generates through referrals. Above 1.0, growth compounds on itself and becomes exponential.View full definition → or Unilever's 2024 annual report as templates. Disclose program structure, funder list, carrying amount, payment term ranges, and movement. Inadequate disclosure is now an SEC enforcement risk.
3. Diversify funders and stress-test withdrawal scenarios. No single funder above 40%; document a 90-day refinancing plan; pre-negotiate substitution rights in the program agreement.
4. Set explicit DPO and concentration guardrails approved by the audit committee. Treat SCF the same way you treat covenants, with hard limits, monitoring, and escalation triggers.
5. **Reframe the program internally