# Wholesale partners and department stores: from gatekeepers to landlords
In 1990, if Chanel wanted to sell handbags in Manhattan, it needed Saks Fifth Avenue's buyers to say yes. Today, Chanel runs its own boutique two blocks from Saks, keeps 100% of the margin, controls the lighting, the staff training, and the customer data, and treats Saks as, at most, a nice place to have a concession. The gatekeeper became a landlord. This lesson explains how that flip happened and who holds power now.
For most of the 20th century, wholesale was the dominant channel for luxury goods. A "wholesale" relationship means the brand (the maison, from the French word for "house," commonly used for heritage luxury brands) sells inventory to a retailer, which then owns it and resells it to consumers, keeping the difference (the margin) between wholesale and retail price.
Department stores like Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, Harrods, Le Bon Marché, and Selfridges controlled the choke point. They decided:
A buyer's rejection could sink a small designer. A prominent window at Harrods could make one. This gave department stores real leverage over even large maisons, because reaching affluent shoppers meant going through their doors.
Starting seriously in the 1990s and accelerating through the 2000s, luxury groups (LVMH, Kering, Richemont, and independents like Chanel and Hermès) began pulling product out of wholesale and into monobrand stores: standalone boutiques carrying only their own brand.
Why maisons pushed this hard:
Margin capture. Wholesale typically hands 40 to 50% of retail price to the department store (figures vary by category and are broadly cited estimates, not fixed rates). Direct retail keeps that margin in-house.
Brand control. No brand wants its handbags next to a discount rack or a rival's display. Monobrand stores let the maison control architecture, lighting, staff scripting, and adjacency entirely.
Data ownership. A department store sale tells the maison almost nothing about the buyer. A direct sale, especially with clienteling (personalized, relationship-based selling tracked via CRMCRMCustomer Relationship Management: software and strategy to manage and analyse customer interactions throughout their lifecycle.View full definition → systems) gives the brand a name, purchase history, and a channel to sell again.
Price integrity. Uncontrolled discounting by a department store can damage a luxury brand's pricing power globally. Owning the store means owning the markdown decision, or avoiding markdowns altogether.
By the 2010s, LVMH and Kering brands were generating the large majority of revenue through directly operated stores rather than wholesale, a trend well documented in both groups' annual reports (see LVMH's investor relations disclosures for current channel mix by maison).
As the top hard-luxury and fashion houses went direct, department stores lost their gatekeeper leverage precisely where it mattered most: with the brands people already wanted.
What replaced wholesale buying in many flagship locations is the concession model (also called shop-in-shop): the brand leases the physical space inside the department store, staffs it with its own employees, sets its own prices, and the department store collects rent plus a percentage of sales, rather than buying inventory at all.
Walk into Harrods' ground floor today and most of what looks like "Harrods selling Chanel" is closer to Chanel operating a mini-boutique that happens to sit inside Harrods' building. Selfridges and Le Bon Marché run similar structures for their top beauty and fashion floors.
This is the landlord model. The department store's value propositionvalue propositionA clear statement of the benefits your product delivers, the problems it solves and why customers should choose you over alternatives.View full definition → shifts from "we decide what you can buy" to:
Department stores still matter, especially for mid-tier brands, emerging designers, and beauty (where wholesale remains stronger), but their power over top-tier fashion and leather goods houses has structurally weakened.
The relationship hasn't fully inverted for everyone. Power depends on brand size and category.
Mega-brands (Chanel, Hermès, Louis Vuitton, Rolex): largely direct. They use department store concessions selectively, mainly for locations they don't want to build alone, and negotiate from strength.
Mid-size and emerging brands: still need wholesale and department store distribution for reachreachThe number of unique people exposed to your message in a given period. Unlike impressions, reach counts each person once, no matter how often they see it.View full definition → and credibility. A department store buy can be the difference between visibility and obscurity for a newer name, similar to the old model.
Beauty and fragrance: wholesale remains structurally important because department stores and specialist retailers like Sephora provide trial, sampling, and impulse purchase environments that a standalone boutique struggles to replicate at scale.
Multi-brand luxury retailers online (Net-a-Porter, Mytheresa, Farfetch, though Farfetch itself faced serious financial distress in 2023 to 2024, a useful case study in platform fragility) occupy a similar structural position to physical department stores: aggregation and curation, with declining leverage over the very top maisons.
For a primer on how department stores are repositioning, see Business of Fashion's ongoing coverage of luxury retail, a widely used industry news source.
Knowledge check
1. In a traditional wholesale relationship between a maison and a department store, what actually happens to ownership of the inventory?
2. Why did department store buyers hold significant power over maisons under the old wholesale model?
3. What is the primary strategic reason a maison would shift from wholesale distribution to opening its own monobrand stores?
4. Select ALL correct answers describing forms of control that department stores exercised over maisons under the traditional gatekeeper model.
Select all the correct answers.
5. Select ALL correct answers that describe consequences of the shift from wholesale to direct monobrand retail for maisons.
Select all the correct answers.
This shift redraws who captures value along the chain.
Simple illustration of the margin difference (illustrative, not brand-specific figures):
The direct model isn't free, maisons now carry the real estate risk, staffing costs, and inventory risk that department stores used to absorb. But it converts a variable-margin, gatekeeper-dependent relationship into one the brand fully controls.
For department stores, the concession model converts them from merchants (buying and reselling goods, bearing inventory risk) into something closer to a real estate and services operator, collecting rent and a sales percentage while bearing far less inventory risk themselves.
This is a broader pattern worth recognizing across the luxury sector: whoever controls the customer relationship and the physical or digital point of sale tends to accumulate power over time, even when they started as the smaller party.
🎬 [VIDEO: "Why Luxury Brands Are Buying Back Their Stores" - youtube.com - search for recent Business of Fashion or CNBC explainers on luxury brands' shift from wholesale to direct retail, illustrating the department store power shift discussed here]