+45 XP

CMO playbook & advanced tactics for brand strategy

The CFO's version of the brand question is short: if we move a fifth of the brand budget into paid search next quarter, what breaks, and when would we see it? Most marketing leaders cannot answer that in numbers, so the money moves. What you own at this level is not what the brand says. It is how much capital the brand gets, which brands in the portfolio deserve capital at all, and whether you can hold that allocation through two bad quarters while every dashboard in the building argues against you.

Core concept: three allocations, one budget

Assume the positioning is settled (the persistent profile the foundations lesson describes) and the architecture decision already taken. What is left is money, and it divides into three arbitrations running on three different clocks.

The brand and performance split pays back over two to three years. Portfolio pruning runs two to five years and usually involves a write-down. The board defence runs on a 90 day clock and has to be re-won every quarter. The accounting makes it harder: a brand you buy sits on the balance sheet as goodwill, a brand you build sits nowhere. You are defending an asset your own finance system does not record.

Sub-concept 1: the split is arithmetic before it is judgement

Binet and Field's work on the IPA databank landed on roughly 60 percent brand, 40 percent activation as the profit-optimal average for consumer categories, with B2B closer to 46/54. Those are averages, not targets. The right number moves with your purchase cycle, your penetration, and how much demand is already primed.

Two mechanics drive it. Activation effects decay in weeks while brand effects accumulate over years, which is why any model with a 12 month payback window will always score brand as the worse investment. And excess share of voice: hold a share of category voice above your share of market and you tend to grow, at a rough rate of half a point of share per year for every 10 points of ESOV.

Adidas gave the clearest public confession of getting this wrong. In 2019 its global media director Simon Peel said the company had been putting around 77 percent of budget into performance and 23 percent into brand, while its own econometrics showed brand activity driving about 65 percent of sales. Last-click attribution had been crediting paid search with demand the brand created upstream.

Sub-concept 2: pruning without destroying value

Whether the portfolio runs as a branded house or a house of brands is the methodology lesson's decision. The money question is narrower: which brands get funded, and what happens to the ones that do not.

Three tests settle it. Can the brand clear minimum effective media weight in its category, or is its budget spread so thin it buys nothing? Is its volume incremental, or cannibalised from a sibling? Does its gross margin cover the fixed cost of its own supply chain, artwork and regulatory work?

P&G ran the largest version of this. From 2014 it exited or discontinued roughly 100 brands, including 43 beauty brands sold to Coty in a deal valued around $12.5 billion, keeping some 65 brands that accounted for about 90 percent of sales and 95 percent of profit. The freed money went to the survivors.

Pruning is not free. Adidas bought Reebok for around $3.8 billion in 2006 and sold it in 2021 for about €2.1 billion. Every year you underfund a brand you intend to sell, you lower its exit price, so the decision to starve and the decision to sell belong in the same meeting.

The opposite failure is concentration. Adidas ended the Yeezy partnership in October 2022 and guided to over a billion euros of lost revenue the following year. A tidy portfolio in which one line carries a disproportionate share of growth is a different risk, not a smaller one.

Sub-concept 3: defending the line to a finance-led board

Boards do not reject brand spend because they dislike brand. They reject it because it arrives without a counterfactual. Bring one. A matched-market holdout is the cheapest instrument available: go dark on brand in two or three comparable regions for two quarters, hold performance spend constant, and measure base volume, blended acquisition cost and discount depth against the controls. You lose a little growth in the test cells and buy a number nobody in the room can argue with.

Then speak in their units. Brand spend defends base volume and price realisation; performance harvests. A brand that holds list price through a promotional quarter is worth more, in stated euros of gross margin, than the same brand described as having 72 percent aided awareness.

The second-order effect is the argument that wins. As awareness decays, paid auctions get more expensive, because you start buying attention you previously got for free. Branded search volume falls, click-through and conversion rates fall with it, and the acquisition cost you were protecting rises anyway, six to twelve months after the cut. The saving does not disappear. It relocates to a different line in the same P&L.

Sub-concept 4: the ratchet and why it keeps working

Cut brand and nothing bad happens for three quarters. Something better than nothing happens: return on ad spend improves, because you are harvesting demand the brand already created and the cheapest conversions come first. That improvement is read as evidence the cut was right, which funds the next cut.

By quarter five or six, acquisition cost climbs, promotional depth deepens to hold volume, and rebuilding costs more than the saving because you are rebuilding from a lower base. Fortune 500 CMO tenure has run in the three to four year range in Spencer Stuart's annual study, shorter than the payback horizon, so the person who made the cut is often gone before the bill arrives.

The counter is procedural rather than rhetorical. Get a floor into the board-approved plan, expressed as a percentage of net revenue on a three year rolling horizon, while the numbers are good. Nobody grants a floor in the middle of a miss.

Real-world cases

Case 1: Airbnb. In 2020 the company cut roughly $800 million of marketing and switched off most performance spend. Traffic returned close to prior levels, with the large majority arriving direct or organic, and the company moved toward brand-led work with "Made possible by Hosts" in 2021 while keeping marketing a smaller share of revenue than in 2019 as revenue grew past it. The caveat matters more than the headline. Airbnb had a decade of accumulated demand and a name people use as a verb. A challenger with thin aided awareness that copies the move goes dark and stays dark. What accumulated brand bought Airbnb was an option to stop paying for traffic, which is not the same claim as performance marketing being waste.

Case 2: P&G. In 2017 Marc Pritchard cut over $200 million of digital spend over viewability, fraud and agency fees, and reported that reach went up rather than down, with further cuts to agency and production costs after that. The arbitration there was working versus non-working money inside an advertising budget of roughly $8 billion a year, not brand versus performance. Most bloated budgets hold a similar layer, and clearing it first buys the credibility you need for the harder argument.

Case 3: Old Spice. The counter-example to pruning. In 2010 P&G and Wieden+Kennedy relaunched a long-declining brand with "The Man Your Man Could Smell Like", aimed at the women who buy men's grooming products, and body wash sales rose 125 percent year over year within six months. Old Spice carried every marker of a divestment candidate. What it lacked was investment aimed at the actual buyer. Before you cut, establish whether the brand is failing or merely mis-targeted.

CMO action items

  • Calculate your real split this week, with agency fees, production and retail media counted honestly. Set it against your ESOV position. Most teams discover they are closer to the Adidas 77/23 than they assumed.
  • Rank every brand by contribution margin after allocated fixed costs, not by revenue. Anything below minimum effective media weight gets funded properly or exited; leaving it half-funded is the expensive middle.
  • Book a matched-market holdout for next quarter and agree the read-out metrics with finance in advance, so the result cannot be relitigated afterwards.
  • Write a brand spend floor as a percentage of net revenue into the three year plan, and get it approved in a good quarter.

Common mistakes that kill results

Mistake 1: Reading the post-cut efficiency bump as proof. Return on ad spend rises after a brand cut for the same reason a reservoir looks fine the week the rain stops. Insist that any efficiency claim is paired with a base volume trend and a branded search trend over four quarters, not one.

Mistake 2: Pruning the tail without removing the cost. Delisting 30 SKUs frees no money if the plant, the artwork studio and the regulatory team stay the same size. P&G's exits came with divestitures and headcount, which is why they showed up in margin. A pruning plan with no cost line attached is a tidy slide, nothing more.

Mistake 3: Defending brand spend in awareness language. Unaided awareness and sentiment scores get a polite hearing and no money. Price premium held under promotion, win rate in contested deals, share of category voice against share of market, and the cost of demand when you stop creating it: those move a finance-led board, because they are already in its model.

Resources

What to do, from this lesson

These actions are compiled in the role's Playbook.

  • Translate brand into a financial argument connecting to price premium, CAC, and LTV
See the full action playbook →

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